

Annex 2 to the Ordinance of the FDJP of [day month] 2017 on the conduct of the
Surveillance of Post and Telecommunications (VD-ÜPF; SR 780.11.XX)

Technical requirements for the delivery networks for the conduct of the Surveillance of Telecommunications

Version 1: [date]
Entry into force: [date]

1 Scope of application

This document is the Annex 2 to the ordinance of the FDJP of [day month] 2017 on the conduct of the surveillance of post and telecommunications (VD-ÜPF).

As set forth in article 25 of the VD-ÜPF, it defines the technical requirements for the delivery networks between the Communication Service Providers (CSP) and the processing system (LEMF, *Verarbeitungssystem*) of the Post and Telecommunications Surveillance Service (PTS Service) for information requests and their answers, interception warrants and orders, results of real-time and retroactive interceptions as well as results of emergency paging and tracing. It also covers the attachment requirements per handover point for CSPs.

Furthermore, based on the VD-ÜPF and its annexes, the PTS Service bilaterally draws up confidential connection agreements with each CSP containing details that are not public, such as the physical handover points, the network addresses, the access points, the responsibilities, the contact details, the service levels and the detailed diagrams of the delivery networks as well as the access arrangements (24/7) to the premises of the PTS Service for CSPs using co-location for direct connection.

The reason for separating such information into several documents lies in their different life cycles and the confidential nature of certain information as well as the specific features of the interfaces. The VD-ÜPF and its annexes are in the public domain. Confidential information must therefore be drafted separately in documents accessible only to the relevant parties.

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2 Abbreviations

3GPP	Third Generation Partnership Project
AS	Autonomous System
BÜPF	“Bundesgesetz vom 18. März 2016 betreffend die Überwachung des Post- und Fernmeldeverkehrs (BÜPF, SR 780.1)” - Federal Act of 18 March 2016 on the Surveillance of Post and Telecommunications
CA	Certification Authority
CC	Content of Communication
CS	Circuit-switched
CSP	Communications Service Provider
DN	Delivery Network
DN-HP	Delivery Network - Handover Point
DSF	Delivery Stack & Formats
DSL	Digital subscriber line
DSS1	Digital Subscriber Signalling System No 1
E.164	International public telecommunication numbering plan defined by ITU-T
ETSI	European Telecommunications Standards Institute
FDJP	Federal Department of Justice and Police
FOITT	Federal Office of Information Technology, Systems and Telecommunication
HI	Handover Interface
HP	Handover Point
IEEE	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IETF	Internet Engineering Task Force
IIF	Internal Interception Function
IP	Internet Protocol
IRI	Interception Related Information
ISDN	Integrated Services Digital Network
ITU-T	International Telecommunication Union - Telecommunication Standardisation Sector
LEA	Law Enforcement Agency
LEMF	Law Enforcement Monitoring Facility
LI	Lawful Interception
LI-HP	Handover Point at the level of LI formats
LIID	Lawful Interception Identifier
MAC	Media Access Control (sub-layer of Layer 2 in the OSI Model)
MD	Mediation Device
NE	Network Equipment
NPS	Network Protocol Stack
VD-ÜPF	Ordinance of the FDJP of [day month] 2017 on the conduct of the Surveillance of Post and Telecommunications (SR 780.11XX)
PRA	Primary Rate Access
PS	Packet-switched
PSTN	Public Switched Telephone Network
PTSS	Post and Telecommunications Surveillance Service
REL	Release Message
SR	“Systematische Sammlung des Bundesrechts” – Classified Compilation of Federal Legislation
TCP	Transport Control Protocol
VPN	Virtual Private Network
VÜPF	„Verordnung vom xx.Xxxxxx 2017 über die Überwachung des Post- und Fernmeldeverkehrs (VÜPF, SR 780.11)“ - Ordinance of xx Xxxxxx 2017 on the Surveillance of Post and Telecommunications
WDM	Wavelength-Division Multiplexing

3 Definitions

See section 3 of the Annex 1 to the ordinance of the FDJP of [day month] 2017 on the conduct of post and telecommunications surveillance (VD-ÜPF)

4 The LEMF

The LEMF production system is designed to be redundant, with a primary system and a secondary system at two separate sites. If there is a major breakdown at the primary system which cannot be fixed within a specific timeframe, a failover procedure can be initiated by the PTSS to make the secondary system active. Except from the service interruption during the failover procedure, it is transparent to the CSP which system is currently active. The LEMF can be accessed by virtual IP addresses distributed at both sites. Therefore, a CSP does not need to implement any manual processes for LEMF system failover.

In addition to the production system, there can be integration, test and training systems.

The details for connecting CSP systems to the LEMF systems are set out in bilateral connection agreements, which also contain a connection matrix.




Figure 1 Overview of the LEMF systems

5 General requirements for delivery networks

The following requirements apply to the delivery networks:

1. The DNs shall be built on existing products.
2. The DNs shall use functions already available, i.e. no new functions are to be specially developed for the DN.
3. The DNs are not "LI aware", i.e. they are not developed specifically for lawful interception. Standard protocols and technologies shall be used.
4. The DN shall be designed in accordance with Annex 1, to ensure the timely delivery of the intercepted data.
5. Based on a threat analysis for the DN's specific architecture, protective measures shall be defined for the DN in question.

6. Geographical redundancy shall be implemented to increase the DN's reliability (two disjoint paths to each of the LEMF sites).
7. Cost-effective installation and operation should be sought.
8. Low administrative expenses should be incurred.
9. Appropriate DNs for CSPs of all sizes shall be defined, i.e. different solutions according to requirements (e.g. number of customers of the CSP, number of interceptions, network architecture of the CSP, data volume per interception).
10. The cost implications for all parties involved shall be taken into consideration.
11. The PTSS and the FOITT shall adhere to the federal rules on information protection and data security.
12. The DN's scalability shall be ensured (fast and simple expansion of available capacity or bandwidth).
13. The hardware and software shall be vendor-neutral.
14. No PTSS equipment shall be on the CSP's premises (except in the case of interceptions implemented by the PTSS).
15. Responsibilities shall be clearly defined between all parties involved.
16. There shall be clear definition of the handover points (DN-HP) between all parties involved.
17. The DN implementation shall respect investment protection.
18. The DN shall be useable for data transmission in both directions (bi-directional), for example for requests and responses related to Warrant Management and Historical Data.

6 Overview of the delivery networks

6.1 Functional architecture

This document covers the delivery network (no. 4 in Figure 2) between the CSPs and the LEMF in accordance with the Swiss LI reference model. The access network (no. 6 in Figure 2) between the LEMF and the LEA is not addressed in this document.




Figure 2 Swiss LI reference model

Figure 2 shows the functional LI architecture in Switzerland, based on the ETSI reference architectures.




Figure 3 Roles, protocol stacks and handover points between the CSP and the PTSS

Figure 3 shows the layers *delivery networks* and *lawful interception formats*. Delivery networks are transparent for lawful interception formats, i.e. they do not check or change the interception data delivered. Furthermore, Figure 3 shows the relationship between the CSP and the PTSS in accordance with the Swiss LI reference model. For the purposes of this document, only the CSP-to-PTSS delivery network and the corresponding handover points are of relevance.

CSP-to-PTSS delivery is ensured by various roles in different network sections. Handover points exist between the various roles.

A distinction is made between handover points at the level of:

- Delivery networks (DN-HP), and
- Lawful interception formats (LI-HP), i.e. LI-specific information (CC, Calling/Called Subaddress field when setting up CC links, IRI formats).

The DN-HP and the LI-HP may be coincident. This is the case at the CSP end in Figure 3. Elsewhere (e.g. in the CSP's network), the DN-HPs are associated with a Service Access Point (SAP) between a delivery network layer (Network Service Provider) and a lawful interception layer (Network Service User).

Moreover, individual connection agreements are drawn up as bilateral documents between the PTSS and each CSP connected to the DN. Each bilateral connection agreement defines the

detailed technical interface requirements a CSP must meet in order to be able to connect to the DN, contains confidential information concerning the interfaces, addresses and delivery networks (e.g. telephone numbers, IP addresses, network diagrams), services (e.g. contacts, availability, failure notifications) and specifies the service level required of the corresponding delivery network, as well as the mechanisms and parameters required by a user entity (e.g. user system, system administrator) for configuration purposes.

The specifications set out in the present document and in the bilateral connection agreements contain all the information needed for implementation and operation of user systems of the corresponding delivery networks.

The document governing the level of lawful interception formats is Annex 1. These aspects are not described in this document.

6.2 Overview of roles in the DN

1. Role of the CSP
2. Role of the LEMF
3. Role of the delivery network provider

6.3 Overview of the LEMF network interfaces with CSPs

1. ISDN interface for CC of CS interceptions
2. Alternatively: IP interface for CC of CS interceptions (with ISDN/PSTN emulation)
3. IP interface for IRI of CS interceptions
4. IP interface for CC and IRI of PS interceptions
5. TCP/IP interfaces for HD (HI-A (administrative) and HI-B (results))
6. TCP/IP interface for HI1 (Order Management and Administration)
7. TCP/IP interface for Information Requests and results

6.4 Overview of the delivery networks between the LEMF and CSPs

1. IP DN: Delivery network for interfaces no. 2, 3 and 4 according to section 6.3.
2. ISDN DN: Delivery network for interface no. 1 according to section 6.3.
3. IP DN for interfaces no. 5, 6 and 7 according to section 6.3.

6.5 Basic topologies of delivery networks

Delivery networks can be divided into two basic topologies:

1. Stratified delivery networks, see Figure 4
2. Concatenated delivery networks, see Figure 5 and Figure 6

There are also combinations of these basic topologies.

The diagrams refer to the area between the CSP and the handover point to the PTSS domain.

Another distinction can be made by the implementation of the handover point, which may be either:

1. in-house (see Figure 4 and Figure 6), or
2. in-span (see Figure 5).

In-house handover points require the hosting of third-party equipment by the owner of the premises (co-location). An advantage is that the connecting link can be kept short, which makes troubleshooting easier in the case of breakdowns and allows for physical protection against unauthorised access (e.g. cage).

In-span handover points generally require longer connecting links, possibly with cable ducts, splices, etc. Troubleshooting takes longer in the case of a breakdown, and physical protection against unauthorised access is generally only possible if the handover point is in the same building.

Note on Figure 4, Figure 5 and Figure 6: These figures give no guidelines for the connection between the LEMF primary system and secondary system. From the CSP's point of view, there is only one LEMF system. Aspects regarding failover (minimising the impact if the primary system breaks down) and the forwarding of information to the LEMF secondary system are not described here. Likewise, no guidelines are given on how to implement at the CSP end the transition from the MD to the NE, which serves as a gateway to the delivery network.

Figure 4 shows an approach for a delivery network based on an upper and a lower stratum. The upper stratum has the lower stratum under its control, as higher protocol layers between the MD and the LEMF are in one hand. The LEMF "sees" only the upper stratum, which falls under the responsibility of the CSP supposed to deliver the interception results.

The LI-HP and DN-HP of a CSP are coincident, which, in the event of an error, requires a triage in a two-part relationship (CSP/Upper Stratum Provider and the PTSS). If the lower stratum is provided by a third party, here too there is a two-part relationship (CSP/Upper Stratum Provider and Lower Stratum Provider).

A typical example of such an approach is a fibre optics network, separated by WDM filters (lower stratum) and an upper stratum per CSP consisting of a network using an allocated wavelength (one possible implementation for such a DN is sub-variant B1 "Shared fibre infrastructure" of IP DN delivery variant B).




Figure 4 Stratified delivery network

Figure 5 and Figure 6 show an approach for a delivery network based on concatenated sub-networks. These sub-networks can have a different top protocol layer.




Figure 5 Concatenated delivery network with in-house handover point




Figure 6 Concatenated delivery network with in-span handover point

The LI-HP and DN-HP of a CSP are not coincident, which, in the event of an error, requires a triage in a relationship between three parties (CSP (blue), DN provider (grey) and the PTSS (purple)). If the LEMF detects that LI information is missing at the LI-HP, it shall be determined whether the fault lies with the CSP (blue), the DN Provider (grey) or the PTSS (purple). One possible implementation of such a Concatenated DN is variant A “OpenVPN”.

7 CS delivery networks

For the delivery of CS interception data, two different interfaces are used in accordance with Annex 1.

1. HI2 handover interface for Interception Related Information (IRI) via the IP DN.
2. HI3 handover interface for Content of Communication (CC) via the CS DN.

7.1 Delivery of CS IRI (HI2)

CS IRI shall be delivered to the LEMF via one of the IP DNs described in section 8.2. The data volume of the CS IRI is negligible compared with the PS CC and IRI.

7.2 Delivery of CS CC (HI3) via CS DN

The CS delivery network between the CSP and the LEMF comprises only the HI3 interface (CS CC) and is shown in Figure 7. Such a delivery network has been in use since 2003. With the current LEMF, a geographical redundancy was introduced. However, the E.164

destination address is the same for both of the redundant LEMF systems. The CSP cannot detect which side of the LEMF is currently active.




Figure 7 Delivery network for Content of Communication of circuit-switched services

The content (CC) of CS interceptions is transferred by the CSP via the usual interconnect interfaces to the universal service licensee. The interconnection documents are on the universal service licensee's website.

The LEMF has a redundant connection to the telephone network (PSTN) of the universal service licensee. It is not planned that CSP build direct PRA terminations to the LEMF (with the exception of the universal service licensee).

The PRAs at both LEMF sites are connected to two geographically separate telephone switches. Together with other redundancy measures, this guarantees a very high level of reliability.

The delivery network itself does not take any recovery action if the set-up of a CC connection fails or if a CC connection is released by the delivery network or the LEMF. Such action shall be initiated by the MF of the CSP.

If a CSP does not have an interconnect interface to the universal service licensee, it shall establish an interconnection via other providers.

Figure 8 shows the handover points and areas of responsibility in the ISDN delivery network for delivery of Content of Communication from circuit-switched services (CS CC). This delivery network corresponds to the basic topology of a "concatenated delivery network" as per Figures 5 and 6.

The handover point between the CSP and the PTSS for LI formats, i.e. the calling and called party subaddress for setting up CC links (LI-HP) and the CSP's handover point for transportation (DN-HP) are not coincident. A triangular relationship thus exists between the LI-HP and two DN-HPs (between the CSP and the ISDN-DN Provider and between the ISDN-DN Provider and the PTSS).




Figure 8 Handover points and areas of responsibility in the ISDN delivery network

Note: Figure 8 contains no guidelines on the internal connections in PTSS' area of responsibility, e.g. concerning overflow traffic between the two LEMF sites.

7.2.1 Security aspects of the CS DN

The bilateral connection agreements shall define specific protective measures for the following points:

- Confidentiality (including data protection)
- Authentication
- Authorised access availability (i.e. no refusal of authorised access to network elements, saved information, information flows, services and applications but not in terms of general availability)
- Data integrity
- Non-repudiation (incontestability of receipt of the data, similar to a registered letter with acknowledgment of receipt)

Figure 9 shows the three functional layers “Cable channels/cabling”, “SS7 Network” and “Network layer”. At the interface between the CSP and the ISDN Delivery Network provider (generally several E1), the “Circuit Switched Content of Communication” (CS CC) traffic is mixed with other interconnect traffic. In the network of the ISDN Delivery Network provider, the payload traffic and the signalling traffic are separated and the CS CC traffic is also mixed with other traffic. In the Primary Rate Accesses (PRA) to the LEMF, only the CS CC traffic is conveyed. CS CC does not contain any identifiers allowing for identification of the target using a telephone directory; only in the Calling Party Subaddress when setting up a CC link there is the parameter “Lawful Interception Identifier” (LIID) which provides a correlation to the target as a unique “order number”. This relationship is treated as confidential between the CSP and the PTSS. Identification of the target would otherwise only be possible by way of voice recognition of the CS CC.

7.2.2 Capacity requirements for the CS DN

Three parameters have an influence on the capacity of the CS DN:

- i. Number of real-time CS interceptions
- ii. Number of CC links required per target session
- iii. Activity of the target

The value of i) shall be agreed bilaterally between the PTSS and the CSP. The value of ii) is generally two CC links in the case of CS (forward and reverse channel of the target). The value of iii) is an indication of the activity, based on the CSP's measurements or statistics. The CSPs themselves ensure that there is sufficient delivery capacity available at their DN-HP to the CS DN.

The PTSS is responsible for ensuring that there is sufficient delivery capacity available at the DN-HP from the CS DN to the LEMF for all CSP deliveries. As the CS DN is a "virtual" network within the universal service licensee's ISDN and the LI traffic, including interconnect traffic, is a small part of the overall volume, the bottleneck lies at the DN-HP end from the CS DN to the LEMF, i.e. the number of ISDN-PRAs to the LEMF. It is up to the PTSS to determine this number of ISDN-PRAs, as the PTSS is the only organisational unit with an overview of the values of each CSP, taking account of the trunking gain (common ISDN-PRAs vs. dedicated ISDN-PRAs per CSP). Scalability is ensured by adapting the number of ISDN-PRAs to the LEMF.

8 IP delivery networks

8.1 Capacity (bandwidth) of the IP DN

The dimensioning of the DNs shall be agreed bilaterally between the PTSS and the CSP. The bandwidth of a DN must be large enough to deliver the interception data including overhead on time and without any information loss resulting from traffic overload in the DN.

8.2 Variants of IP delivery networks

The variant ultimately chosen by a CSP must be agreed upon with the PTSS.

There are currently two variants of the IP DN:

- A) OpenVPN
- B) Direct connection of a CSP to the PTSS

In order to accommodate new requirements such as bi-directional transmission of Warrant Management data or Historical data, the IP DN variants shall be adapted accordingly.

8.2.1 IP DN Variant A: OpenVPN

Data transmission across public networks must be secured through encryption. OpenVPN has been chosen as the basic principle. The CSPs are not obliged to choose a particular commercial product or vendor as OpenVPN is available as an open source software solution.

The CSP shall set up one or more individual VPN tunnels to the LEMF. The PTSS is the single point of contact (SPOC) for the CSP.

The CSP shall acquire its VPN clients at its own discretion.

The FOITT is the provider of IP DN Variant A. The CSP manages the connections with the FOITT and arranges for the required service level through Service Level Agreements with its peering partner or upstream provider.

The PTSS acquires the VPN servers. The PTSS is responsible for the connection between the delivery network provider (FOITT) and the LEMF. The VPN keys and certificates are managed and assigned by the PTSS as the CA. The PTSS defines the IP addressing plan which is mandatory. The PTSS publishes an informative guideline called *OpenVPN Handbook* which provides details to the CSPs on how to implement the VPN access.

The CSPs can use Internet upstream, private or public peering with the FOITT. In order to reduce the risk of interruption, the delivery from the CSP shall provide as much redundancy as possible.

The CSP is responsible for its Internet accesses and for the correct operations of the VPN client. The VPN tunnel is the joint responsibility of the CSP and the PTSS. The PTSS is responsible for the correct operations of the VPN server. Problems shall be dealt with in accordance with the error handling process (see Section 12).

8.2.1.1 VPN tunnel CSP - LEMF

One or more VPN tunnels are configured between the CSP and the LEMF.

8.2.1.2 Overview




Figure 10 Schematic layout of IP DN Variant A: OpenVPN




Figure 11 Handover points of IP DN Variant A: OpenVPN

Regarding the physical handover points 3 and 4 in Figure 11, there are basically two configurations from the CSP's point of view:

1. No direct peering with the FOITT (connection via upstream provider to the FOITT)

2. Direct peering with the FOITT (direct peering agreement between the CSP's AS and the FOITT's AS)

8.2.1.3 Threat analysis of the IP DN Variant A: OpenVPN

The bilateral connection agreements shall define specific protective measures for the following points:

- Confidentiality (including data protection)
- Authentication
- Authorised access availability (i.e. no refusal of authorised access to network elements, saved information, information flows, services and applications but not in terms of general availability)
- Data integrity
- Non-repudiation (incontestability of receipt of the data, similar to a registered letter with acknowledgment of receipt)

8.2.1.4 Scalability of the IP DN Variant A: OpenVPN

The scalability of the DN is restricted by the overall capacity of the FOITT transport network (backhauling) to the LEMF and by the capacity of the CSP's peering partner or Internet access. The OpenVPN variant thus offers a limited available bandwidth.

The FOITT peering interface can be expanded up to a certain maximum bandwidth. There is also a maximum bandwidth for the FOITT transport network (backhauling) and the FOITT-PTSS interface. However, on account of the redundancy, the maximum individual bandwidth available per CSP is lower than the overall bandwidth.

The throughput within an OpenVPN tunnel is also limited. This capacity can be increased by using more powerful processors (vertical scaling). Also, additional OpenVPN tunnels may be added (horizontal scaling). The details are addressed in the bilateral connection agreements between the PTSS and the CSPs.

8.2.2 IP DN Variant B: Direct connection of a CSP to the PTSS

The CSP's handover point (DN-HP) resides on the premises of the PTSS, near the LEMF system. The PTSS provides on its premises a shared co-location for a limited number of CSPs. Each CSP is responsible for the installation, operation and maintenance of its network termination equipment within the co-location. The interception data is handed over at the DN-HP non-encrypted. The CSP is responsible for the data delivery up to the handover points (DN-HP) on the premises of the PTSS.




Figure 13 Schematic layout of IP DN Variant B: Direct connection of a CSP to the PTSS

The DN-HP between the CSP and the LEMF is the Ethernet port of the CSP's network termination equipment. A handover interface with the following specifications is available per CSP at each of the two LEMF sites:

- 1000BASE-SX, 1000BASE-T or 1000BASE-LX
- Connector: Electrical RJ-45 or optical LC
- No Spanning Tree Protocol (STP)
- Untagged

The interfaces at both LEMF sites are connected on Ethernet level. Special attention shall be given to avoid loops at the CSP end.

There are solutions with or without the CSP's router on the premises of the PTSS. A CSP is free to decide whether it wishes to set up its router in the PTSS' co-location facility or elsewhere.

ASR: Aggregation Service Router
 CO: Central Office
 CSP: Communication Service Provider
 DF: Distribution Function
 LEMF: Law Enforcement Monitoring Function
 ODF: Optical Distribution Frame
 OF: Optical Fibre
 ONT-SR: Optical Network Terminal – Service Router
 MF: Mediation Function
 WAN: Wide Area Network




Figure 14 IP DN Variant B: Direct connection of a CSP to the PTSS

8.2.2.1 Threat analysis of the IP DN Variant B: Direct connection of a CSP to the PTSS

The bilateral connection agreements shall define specific protective measures for the following points:

- Confidentiality (including data protection)
- Authentication
- Authorised access availability (i.e. no refusal of authorised access to network elements, saved information, information flows, services and applications but not in terms of general availability)
- Data integrity
- Non-repudiation (incontestability of receipt of the data, similar to a registered letter with acknowledgment of receipt)

8.2.2.2 Scalability of the IP DN Variant B: Direct connection of a CSP to the PTSS

The scalability of the DN in this variant is restricted by the technology and interfaces used. The details are addressed in the bilateral connection agreements between the PTSS and the CSPs..

8.2.3 IP DN sub-variant B1: Shared access infrastructure

The providers of a shared access infrastructure may offer other CSPs the possibility of sharing the available access media between two co-locations of a shared access provider and both co-locations of the PTSS. The DN-HPs are described in Figure 16. This allows CSP to take advantage of their existing interconnection points with a provider of a shared access infrastructure (e.g. fibre access) and to get a direct connection to PTSS without having to build it physically.




Figure 16 End-to-End view of shared access infrastructure

8.2.3.1 Threat analysis of the IP DN sub-variant B1: Shared access infrastructure

The bilateral connection agreements shall define specific protective measures for the following points:

- Confidentiality (including data protection)
- Authentication
- Authorised access availability (i.e. no refusal of authorised access to network elements, saved information, information flows, services and applications but not in terms of general availability)
- Data integrity
- Non-repudiation (incontestability of receipt of the data, similar to a registered letter with acknowledgment of receipt)

In the basic concept it is assumed that no service higher than level 1 is implemented between the CSP network and the transport provider network. Otherwise, the functional layers in the bilateral connection agreement shall be amended as appropriate. Higher protocol layers are separated in the upper stratum under the control of a single CSP.

8.2.3.2 Scalability of the IP DN sub-variant B1: Shared access infrastructure

The scalability of this IP DN sub-variant is limited by the technology and the interfaces used. For example, in the case of a shared fibre access infrastructure, different wavelengths can be used for the transmission. The details are addressed in the bilateral connection agreements between the PTSS and the CSPs..

9 Security

9.1 Scope

The data transmission across the delivery networks must be secured. Such data consists of information requests and their answers, interception warrants and orders, as well as results of real-time and retroactive interceptions.

The following general objectives must be met:

- Protection from deliberate acts
- Protection from inadvertent damage
- Protection from organisational defects
- Protection from technical failure
- Protection from human error

The specific security-related aspects of the individual DN variants are addressed in the "Threat analysis" sections in chapter 8.

Note: The internal security requirements within the CSP domain and the PTSS domain as well as the protection from the effects of fire, water, natural hazards and other disasters are not dealt with here.

9.2 Reliability and availability

The target value for the availability of the delivery networks per CSP to the DN-HP, in the case of a direct connection, or to point 3 in Figure 11, in the case of OpenVPN, is 99.8% (calculated over a calendar year). Although the OpenVPN connections via the Internet are on a "best effort" basis, they shall include redundancy.

A high degree of reliability of the DN (avoidance of complete failure of the DN) is achieved by avoiding Single Points of Failure.

The administrative interface using secure email may be used to support several administrative processes. In addition, the secure email can also be used to transport results of retroactive interceptions and information requests results.

The LEMF is geographically distributed over two sites. If one LEMF system breaks down, the PTSS is responsible for switching from one end to the other. The failover mechanism and internal routing are controlled by the LEMF and shall not impact the CSPs.

Note: For the CS CC, an interruption of the CC links and the corresponding data loss are unavoidable for the duration of the failover.

The CSPs shall implement a redundant delivery via disjoint paths or other suitable measures so that traffic can be routed via an alternative delivery path in the case of a breakdown.

10 Quality of service

The OpenVPN DN variant uses the Internet which does not provide resource reservation control mechanisms. This means that delivery of data via the Internet is on a "best effort" basis. There is no guarantee in terms of quality of service (e.g. latency, IP packet loss). However, the CSPs shall make all reasonable effort to avoid data loss, especially by using Internet accesses with sufficient bandwidth and by scaling up the OpenVPN tunnels.

If the bandwidth requirements of a CSP cannot be met with the OpenVPN DN variant then the CSP shall implement the direct connection variant according to prior agreement with the PTSS.

11 Signalling sequences for the CS delivery network

The following diagrams show signalling sequences at both handover points from the CSP to the ISDN-DN provider (ISUP sequences) and from the ISDN-DN provider to the PTSS (DSS1 sequences). Figure 22 shows a successful and complete delivery of CS-CC.




Figure 22 Signalling sequences for the required set-up and release of a CC link

The ANM is a form of acknowledgment for the CSP (received by the MD) that a CC link has been set up and the delivery of CC is starting. After the intercepted connection is released, the CC links are also released by the MD and the LEMF receives a REL with cause value 16 and the location "user" (0000).

Figure 23, Figure 24 and Figure 25 show unsuccessful attempts to set up a CC link. The MD will repeat the connection set-up attempts a specific number of times (not shown in Figure 23, Figure 24 and Figure 25).




Figure 23 Signalling sequences in case of rejection of set-up of a CC link by the ISDN delivery network

The REL message at the handover point between the CSP and the ISDN-DN provider contains a cause value that indicates the location of the error.

Table 1 shows all cause values that can occur, as specified by the universal service licensee (based on the corresponding international standards). The CSP's incoming network receives information on which entity has caused an error. In principle, all the CSP needs to know is whether it has caused the error itself. In the case of an error with the ISDN-DN or the LEMF, the CSP has to send a message to the ISDN-DN provider and/or the PTSS. The detailed determination of the reason falls under the responsibility of the ISDN-DN provider or the PTSS. In cases where the cause is not clear (e.g. "MD or ISDN-DN"), further investigations must be carried out jointly.

Table 1: Cause values and location in case of rejection of set-up of a CC link by the ISDN delivery network

ITU-T Q.850 (05/98)		Location	Failure caused by	Responsibility
Cause value	Definition			
1	Unallocated Number	Other than user (0000)	MD	CSP
17	User Busy	Other than user (0000)	LEMF	PTSS
21	Call Rejected	Other than user (0000)	MD	CSP
25	Exchange Routing Error	Other than user (0000)	ISDN-DN	ISDN-DN Provider
27	Destination Out of Order	Other than user (0000)	LEMF	PTSS
28	Invalid Number Format (addr incomplete)	Other than user (0000)	MD	CSP
31	Normal, Unspecified	Other than user (0000)	MD or ISDN-DN	CSP
34	No Circuit/Channel Available	Other than user (0000)	ISDN-DN or LEMF	PTSS
38	Network Out of Order	Other than user (0000)	ISDN-DN	ISDN-DN Provider
41	Temporary Failure	Other than user (0000)	ISDN-DN	ISDN-DN Provider
42	Switching Equipment Congestion	Other than user (0000)	ISDN-DN	ISDN-DN Provider
57	Bearer Capability Not Authorized	Other than user (0000)	MD	CSP
102	Recovery on Timer Expiry	Other than user (0000)	ISDN-DN	ISDN-DN Provider
111	Protocol Error, Unspecified	Other than user (0000)	MD or ISDN-DN	CSP




Figure 24 Signalling sequences for release during set-up of a CC link by the ISDN delivery network

The REL message at the handover point between the CSP and the ISDN-DN provider contains a cause value that indicates the location of the error.

Table 1 shows all cause values that can occur, as specified by the universal service licensee (based on the corresponding international standards). The CSP's incoming network receives information on which entity has caused an error. In principle, all the CSP needs to know is whether it has caused the error itself. In the case of an error with the ISDN-DN or the LEMf, the CSP has to send a message to the ISDN-DN provider and/or the PTSS. The detailed determination of the reason falls under the responsibility of the ISDN-DN provider or the PTSS. In cases where the cause is not clear (e.g. "ISDN-DN or MD"), further investigations shall be carried out jointly.

Table 2: Cause values and location in case of release of set-up of a CC link by the ISDN delivery network

ITU-T Q.850 (05/98)		Location	Failure caused by	Responsibility
Cause value	Definition			
27	Destination Out of Order	Other than user (0000)	ISDN-DN or LEMF	PTSS
31	Normal, Unspecified	Other than user (0000)	MD or ISDN-DN or LEMF	PTSS
38	Network Out of Order	Other than user (0000)	ISDN-DN or LEMF	PTSS
41	Temporary Failure	Other than user (0000)	ISDN-DN	ISDN-DN Provider
102	Recovery on Timer Expiry	Other than user (0000)	MD or ISDN-DN or LEMF	PTSS
111	Protocol Error, Unspecified	Other than user (0000)	MD or ISDN-DN or LEMF	PTSS




Figure 25: Signalling sequences in case of rejection of set-up of a CC link by the LEMF

Unless otherwise stated in Table 3, the REL messages at the handover point between the CSP and the ISDN-DN provider and at the handover point between the PTSS and the ISDN-DN provider contain the same cause value indicating the location of the error.

The LEMF is not required to support all the cause values of Table 3. Table 3 merely indicates how the cause values shall be interpreted by the receiving entity. In principle, all the CSP needs to know is whether the error lies in the LEMF. The detailed determination of the reason falls under the responsibility of the PTSS. As the PTSS itself knows the status (all cause values are given by the LEMF), it does not need a separate message from the CSP or the ISDN-DN provider.

Table 3: Cause values and location in case of rejection of set-up of a CC link by the LEMF

ITU-T Q.850 (05/98)		Location	Failure caused by
Cause value	Definition		
1	Unallocated Number	user (0000)	LEMF
17	User Busy	user (0000)	LEMF
18	No User Responding	user (0000)	LEMF
19	No Answer from User (user alerted)	user (0000)	LEMF
20	Subscriber Absent	user (0000)	LEMF
21	Call Rejected	user (0000)	LEMF
22	Number Changed	user (0000)	LEMF
27	Destination Out of Order	user (0000)	LEMF
31 may be different at PTSS side since the ISDN delivery network translates any cause value not appearing in this Table into 31	Normal, Unspecified	user (0000)	LEMF
34	No Circuit/Channel Available	user (0000)	LEMF
41	Temporary Failure	user (0000)	LEMF
42	Switching Equipment Congestion	user (0000)	LEMF
44 at PTSS side only, appears as 17 or 34 at MD side	Requested Circuit/Channel N/A	user (0000)	LEMF
47	Resource Unavailable, Unspecified	user (0000)	LEMF
65	Bearer Capability Not Implemented	user (0000)	LEMF
88	Incompatible Destination	user (0000)	LEMF

Figure 26 and Figure 27 show abnormal releases of a CC link set-up. The MD repeats the connection set-up attempts a specific number of times in accordance with Annex 1.




Figure 26: Signalling sequences for release of a CC link as a result of an error detected in the ISDN delivery network

NOTE: If an error is detected by the ISDN delivery network, the cause may also lie outside of this network (see table of cause values).

The REL messages at the handover point between the CSP and the ISDN-DN provider and at the handover point between the PTSS and the ISDN-DN provider contain the same cause value indicating the location of the error.

Table 4 shows all cause values that can occur, as specified by the universal service licensee (based on the corresponding international standards). The CSP's incoming network receives information on which entity has caused an error. In principle, all the CSP needs to know is whether it has caused the error itself. In the case of an error with the ISDN-DN or the LEMF, the CSP has to send a message to the ISDN-DN provider and/or the PTSS, as the case may be. The detailed determination of the reason falls under the responsibility of the ISDN-DN provider or the PTSS. In cases where the cause is not clear (e.g. "ISDN-DN or MD"), further investigations shall be carried out jointly.

Table 4: Cause values and location in case of release of a CC link as a result of an error detected in the ISDN delivery network

ITU-T Q.850 (05/98)		Location	Failure caused by
Cause value	Definition		
31	Normal, Unspecified	Other than user (0000)	MD or ISDN-DN or LEMF
38	Network Out of Order	Other than user (0000)	ISDN-DN or LEMF
41	Temporary Failure	Other than user (0000)	ISDN-DN
102	Recovery on Timer Expiry	Other than user (0000)	MD or ISDN-DN or LEMF
111	Protocol Error, Unspecified	Other than user (0000)	MD or ISDN-DN or LEMF




Figure 27 Signalling sequences for release of a CC link as a result of an error in the LEMF

Unless otherwise explicitly stated in Table 5, the REL messages at the handover point between the CSP and the ISDN-DN provider and at the handover point between the PTSS and the ISDN-DN provider contain the same cause value indicating the location of the error.

The LEMF is not required to support all the cause values of Table 5. Table 5 merely indicates how the cause values shall be interpreted by the receiving entity. In principle, all the CSP needs to know is whether the error lies in the LEMF. The detailed determination of the reason falls under the responsibility of the PTSS. As the PTSS itself knows the status (all cause values are given by the LEMF), it does not need a separate message from the CSP or the ISDN-DN provider.

Table 5 Cause values and location in case of release of a CC link as a result of an error in the LEMF

ITU-T Q.850 (05/98)		Location	Failure caused by
Cause value	Definition		
16	Normal Call Clearing	user (0000)	LEMf (normally, LEMf must not release a CC link)
27	Destination Out of Order	user (0000)	LEMf
31 may be different at PTSS side since the ISDN delivery network translates any cause value not appearing in this Table into 31	Normal, Unspecified	user (0000)	LEMf
41	Temporary Failure	user (0000)	LEMf
47	Resource Unavailable, Unspecified	user (0000)	LEMf

12 Protocol stack for the IP delivery network

The protocol stack for the IP delivery network connection is shown in the table below:

NETWORK	IP v4 according to IETF RFC 791
MAC-Frame	MAC Frame Format according to IEEE 802.3
PHYSICAL	Electrical or optical interface according to IEEE 802.3 1000BASE-T, 1000BASE-SX or 1000BASE-LX Connector: Electrical RJ-45 or optical LC

For connecting to IP delivery networks, the systems being attached shall support at least one protocol stack for the lower layers capable of providing the bandwidth required to deliver the results of interception for a specific service with the specified number of concurrent interceptions.

Protocol stacks with Tagged MAC Frame Format are preferred.

MAC-Frame	Basic MAC Frame Format according to IEEE 802.3 clause 3.1.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4
PHYSICAL	1000Base-T according to IEEE 802.3 clause 40 Connector: RJ45

MAC-Frame	Basic MAC Frame Format according to IEEE 802.3 clause 3.1.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4
PHYSICAL	1000Base-SX or 1000Base-LX, according to IEEE 802.3 clause 38 single-mode or multimode Connector: LC with single-mode or multimode fibre

MAC-Frame	Tagged MAC Frame Format according to IEEE 802.3 clause 3.2 (in particular 3.2.7 item b)), 3.3 and 3.4, and IEEE 802.1Q clause 9 and Annex C
PHYSICAL	1000Base-T according to IEEE 802.3 clause 40 Connector: RJ45

MAC-Frame	Tagged MAC Frame Format according to IEEE 802.3 clause 3.2 (in particular 3.2.7 item b)), 3.3 and 3.4, and IEEE 802.1Q clause 9 and Annex C
PHYSICAL	1000Base-SX or 1000Base-LX, according to IEEE 802.3 clause 38 single-mode or multimode Connector: LC with single-mode or multimode fibre

For connecting to the delivery network, the systems being attached shall support IP according to IETF RFC 791.

In relation to the IP-Header, the systems being attached to the delivery network shall meet the following requirements:

- a) It shall be possible to enter into the equipment any source address and any destination address
- b) It shall be possible to enter into the equipment any sub-net mask
- c) It shall be possible to enter into the equipment any value for the field Precedence/TOS according to IETF RFC 791 and DiffServ according to IETF RFC 2474, respectively.

13 Equipment hosting

The use of in-house handover points in PTSS premises by a CSP requires equipment hosting. The following basic requirements shall be met by the hoster's building infrastructure and the hosted equipment. The details of the equipment hosting shall be agreed between the CSP and the PTSS in the bilateral connection agreement.

13.1 Power supply and earthing

With regard to the power supply, the systems must comply with the European standard ETSI ETS EN 300 132-3 V1.2.1 (2003-08) "Environmental Engineering (EE); Power supply interface at the input to telecommunications equipment; Part 3: Operated by rectified current source, alternating current source or direct current source up to 400 V".

With regard to earthing, the systems must comply with the European Standard ETSI EN 300 253 V2.1.1 (2002 04) "Environmental Engineering (EE); Earthing and bonding configuration inside telecommunications centres". A server farm (consisting of locally installed equipment) is also classified as "telecommunication equipment".

13.2 Environmental conditions

Environmental conditions refer to the conditions to which the equipment is exposed in the course of transportation, installation and operation. This concept paper refers only to the conditions for installation and operation.

For indoor operation, the equipment must at least meet the requirements of the ETSI European Standard EN 300 019-1-3 V2.4.1 (2014-04) "Environmental Engineering (EE); Environmental conditions and environmental tests for telecommunications equipment; Part 1-3: Classification of environmental conditions; Stationary use at weatherprotected locations".

For the broadband network equipment listed below, the requirements for "Class 3.2" must be met.

1. DSL port
2. Combined ports (e.g. MSAN, analogue/DSL, ISDN/DSL)
3. Network termination for ISDN basic access
4. WiMAX base station
5. Optical line termination (OLT)

For equipment in operation according to Class 3.1, operators and manufacturers are required to declare any loss of performance caused by exceptional conditions. Losses of performance are not permitted unless declared in advance.

13.3 Maximum power dissipation of equipment

All equipment providers of a delivery network (this may be a CSP itself, or a third party that provides a delivery network) that is hosted by another third party must declare the maximum power dissipation (in W) of their equipment.

13.4 Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC)

The equipment must comply with the European Standard ETSI EN 300 386 v1.6.1 (2012-09) "Electromagnetic compatibility and Radio spectrum Matters (ERM); Telecommunication network equipment; ElectroMagnetic Compatibility (EMC) requirements", with regard to the emission of electromagnetic interference and immunity to such interference.

13.5 Electrostatic discharge (ESD)

The equipment must comply with the European Standard ETSI EN 300 386 v1.6.1 (2012-09) "Electromagnetic compatibility and Radio spectrum Matters (ERM); Telecommunication network equipment; ElectroMagnetic Compatibility (EMC) requirements", with regard to electrostatic discharge to humans or objects.

13.6 Resistibility to overvoltages and overcurrents

The equipment must comply with the European Standard ETSI EN 300 386 v1.6.1 (2012-09) "Electromagnetic compatibility and Radio spectrum Matters (ERM); Telecommunication network equipment; ElectroMagnetic Compatibility (EMC) requirements", with regard to resistibility to overvoltages and overcurrents.

13.7 Uninterruptible power supply (UPS)

The UPS equipment must comply with the Technical Report ETSI TR 102 446 V1.1.1 (2005-11) "Environmental Engineering (EE); General Requirements for UPS for use in Telecommunication Environment". Both LEMF sites have a UPS and an emergency power supply.

13.8 Safety

The Electrosuisse (SEV) standards with regard to electrical safety must be met.

13.9 Space requirements

All providers of delivery network equipment (this may be a CSP itself, or a third party providing a delivery network) that is hosted by another third party, must declare the space requirements of their equipment.

14 List of Technical Specifications

This section provides a list of the ETSI European Telecommunication Standards (ETS), ETSI European Standards (EN), ETSI Technical Reports (TR), IEEE Standards, IETF Requests for Comments (RFC), ISO standards and ITU-T Recommendations used in this annex. It is meant to ease the reading.

ETSI EN 300 019-1-3 V2.4.1 (2014-04)	Environmental Engineering (EE); Environmental conditions and environmental tests for telecommunications equipment; Part 1-3: Classification of environmental conditions; Stationary use at weatherprotected locations
ETSI ETS EN 300 132-3 V1.2.1 (2003-08)	Environmental Engineering (EE); Power supply interface at the input to telecommunications equipment; Part 3: Operated by rectified current source, alternating current source or direct current source up to 400 V
ETSI ETS EN 300 253 V2.1.1 (2002 04)	Environmental Engineering (EE); Earthing and bonding configuration inside telecommunications centres
ETSI EN 300 386 V1.6.1 (2012-09)	Electromagnetic compatibility and Radio spectrum Matters (ERM); Telecommunication network equipment; ElectroMagnetic Compatibility (EMC) requirements
ETSI TR 102 446 V1.1.1 (2005-11)	Environmental Engineering (EE); General Requirements for UPS for use in Telecommunication Environment
IEEE 802.3™-2015	IEEE Standard for Ethernet
IETF RFC 791	Internet Protocol
IETF RFC 2474	Definition of the Differentiated Services Field (DS Field) in the IPv4 and IPv6 Headers
ITU-T Q.850 (05/98)	Usage of cause and location in the Digital Subscriber Signalling System No. 1 and the Signalling System No. 7 ISDN User Part

Table 14-1: List of technical specifications